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Abstract
It is hard to exaggerate the role of economic aggregators — functions that summarize numerous
and / or heterogeneous data — in economic models since the early XXth century. In many cases, as
witnessed by the pioneering works of Cobb and Douglas, these functions were information quantities
tailored to economic theories, i.e. they were built to fit economic phenomena. In this paper, we
look at these functions from the complementary side: information. We use a recent toolbox built
on top of a vast class of distortions coined by Bregman, whose application field rivals metrics’ in
various subfields of mathematics. This toolbox makes it possible to find the quality of an aggregator
(for consumptions, prices, labor, capital, wages, etc.), from the standpoint of the information it
carries. We prove a rather striking result. From the informational standpoint, well-known economic
aggregators do belong to the optimal set. As common economic assumptions enter the analysis,
this large set shrinks, and it essentially ends up exactly fitting either CES, or Cobb-Douglas, or
both. To summarize, in the relevant economic contexts, one could not have crafted better some
aggregator from the information standpoint. We also discuss global economic behaviors of optimal
information aggregators in general, and present a brief panorama of the links between economic
and information aggregators.
Keywords : Economic Aggregators, CES, Cobb-Douglas, Bregman divergences
1 Introduction
Since the end of the XIXth century and the birth of the “neo-classical” school, mathematics have
played a growing role in economics. With the works of Le´on Walras, the question of aggregation of
the behavior of many individuals has risen and become central in the economic theory. In order to
represent as well as possible the evolution of these aggregate variables, some mathematical functions
have been proposed and become very famous in the economic literature.
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One of the most famous neo-classical function is the Cobb-Douglas [7, 19]. This function is of
particular interest, since it allows for perfect substitutability between the different inputs it depends
on. Another well-known “linear” function was later formulated by Leontief [13], in which inputs are
conversely complementary. The choice of such a function to describe the production process has very
strong implications at the macroeconomic level, as illustrated by many results found by Keynesians
economics in the literature on growth theory.
But beyond these different aggregate functions, one of the most recently built and well-known one
is the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function elaborated by Arrow et al. [2]. Indeed, in
the Cobb-Douglas production function, the elasticity of substitution of capital for labor is fixed to
unity. This implies that a one percent increase in the capital stock implies an equal one percent fall
in labor inputs in order to maintain a constant production level, given the structure of relative prices.
On the contrary, the CES function allows this elasticity to lie between zero and infinity, but to stay
fixed at that number along and across the isoquants, whatever the quantities of inputs that are used
in the production process. The main advantage exhibited by the CES function is that it encompasses
the Cobb-Douglas, the Leontief and the Linear production functions, which are in fact limit and thus
particular cases of it. Nevertheless, one of the reasons economists have kept on using simpler functions
such as the Cobb-Douglas one is the heavy calculus to which the CES function often leads, especially
at the point where models have to be closed.
In a seminal work, Douglas in [10] highlights the importance of the progresses in the field of
statistical information in the genesis of his essay. Pioneering works of Cobb and Douglas [7], and
Arrow et al. [2], underline the inductive nature of the inception of their respective functions, as
the purpose was to fit as best as possible information quantities (aggregators) to observed economic
phenomena. In this paper, we take a deductive route paved with a rigorous information material, to
derive these fundamental quantities based on two assumptions:
• an aggregator should always be as informative as possible with respect to the data it summarizes
(prices, consumptions, wages, capital, labor, etc.);
• an aggregator might be require to satisfy standard economic assumptions, relying on aggregator
dualities (prices / consumptions, wages / labor, etc.), elasticities, marginal rates of substitutions,
returns to scale, etc.
The starting point of our work is a class of distortions coined in the sixties by Bregman [6], in the
context of convex programming. Though they were born four decades ago, it was only much later
that these distortions literally spread out to other fields, including statistics, signal processing and
classification [12], fields where they had to become undeniably central. It was even later that was
discovered their broad applicability, with an axiomatization that makes it possible to relate them
to metrics and their spawns [3]. Very roughly, Bregman divergences are non-negative functions that
meet the same identity of indiscernibles condition as metrics, and rely on a third assumption about
the existence of a particular aggregator which minimizes the total distortion to a set. This last
condition, which can be rephrased as a maximum likelihood condition, makes this aggregator the
most informative quantity about the data, and we call it a Low Distortion Aggregator (LDA).
In this paper, our contribution is threefold. First, we make a clear partition of economic aggregators
with respect to information, as we show that some are LDAs (CES, Cobb-Douglas), some are limit
cases of LDAs (Leontief), and some are neither (Mitscherlich-Spillman-von Thu¨nen). Without more
assumptions, the set of all LDAs is huge, yet we show that global trends of economic relevance can be
easily shown for all, such as on marginal rates of substitution, and the set can be quite easily drilled
down for aggregators with general behaviors, such as concavity or convexity. This, in fact, is our last
contribution. Our main contribution is to show that, when we plug in various standard economic
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assumptions (see above), the set of all LDAs reduces to a particular subset which precisely matches
CES, Cobb-Douglas, or both sets. This novel advocacy for the use of these popular aggregators brings
a very strong information-theoretic rationale to their “economic” existence.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents LDAs and their main
properties. In Section 3, we relate common economic aggregators to LDAs. Section 4 discusses
additional properties of LDAs. A last section concludes the paper, with avenues for future research.
In order not to laden the paper’s body, all proofs have been postponed to an appendix.
2 Low-distortion aggregators
For any strictly convex function ϕ : X→ R differentiable on int(X), with X ⊆ Rd convex, the Bregman
Divergence Dϕ with generator ϕ is [6, 3]:
Dϕ(x||y)
def
= ϕ(x)− ϕ(y)− 〈x− y,∇ϕ(y)〉 , (1)
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product, and ∇ϕ
def
= [∂ϕ/∂xi]
⊤ is the gradient operator. In this paper,
bold notations such as x shall denote vector-based notations, and blackboard faces such as X sets of
(tuples of) real numbers or natural integers of R or N respectively. Dϕ(x||y) is the difference between
the value of ϕ at x and the value at x of the hyperplane tangent to ϕ in y. Bregman divergences
encode a natural notion of distortion, as shown by Theorem 1 below. Its proof is a slight variation of
Theorem 4 in [3] (see also [4]).
Theorem 1 Let F : Rd×Rd → R be a function that satisfies the following three axioms (∀x,y ∈ Rd):
1. non-negativity: F (x,y) ≥ 0;
2. identity of indiscernibles: F (x,y) = 0 if and only if x = y;
3. the expectation is the lowest distortion’s predictor: for any random variable X whose distribution
D has support Rd,
argy∈Rd minEDF (X,y) = EDX(
def
= µX) , (2)
where ED denotes the mathematical expectation.
Then F (x,y) = Dϕ(x||y) for some strictly convex and differentiable ϕ : R
d → R.
(proof: see the Appendix) It is easy to check that any Bregman divergence satisfies [1], [2] and [3] [4],
and so Theorem 1 provides a complete characterization of Bregman divergences, in the same way as
conditions [1] and [2], completed with symmetry and subadditivity, would axiomatize a metric. This
positions Bregman divergences with respect to numerous metric-related notions, and gives the impor-
tance of their main difference, eq. (2). Eq. (2) is fundamental because it says that the (arithmetic)
expectation is the lowest distortion parameter for a population, regardless of the distortion. Actually,
eq. (2) says much more: the expectation is maximum likelihood estimator of data for a large set of
distributions called the exponential families. These families contain some of the most popular distri-
butions, such as Bernoulli, multinomial, beta, gamma, normal, Rayleigh, Laplacian, Poisson [4, 15].
A remarkable property is that any member satisfies the following identity [4]:
logPr[x|θ, ϕ] = −Dϕ(x||µθ) + log bϕ(x) . (3)
3
dom(ϕ) φ(x) Dϕ(x||y) Divergence name
R
d x2
∑d
i=1 (xi − yi)
2 Squared Euclidean norm
R
d
+ x log x− x
∑d
i=1 xi log
xi
yi
− xi + yi Kullback-Leibler div.
Pd id.
∑d
i=1 xi log
xi
yi
Entropy
R
d
+ − log x
∑d
i=1
xi
yi
− log xiyi − 1 Itakura-Saito div.
[0, 1]
x log x
+(1− x) log(1− x)
x log xy
+(1− x) log 1−x1−y
Logistic loss
Table 1: Correspondence between various generators and their Bregman divergences. Pd is the d-
dimensional probability simplex. The generator of the Bregman divergence is defined by ϕ(x)
def
=∑d
i=1 φ(xi) (see text).
θ defines the so-called natural parameters of the distribution, and bϕ(.) is a normalization function. It
follows from (3) and (2) that the maximum likelihood estimator of data is the expectation parameter
µθ.
Some Bregman divergences have become cornerstones of various fields of mathematics and com-
puter science, as shown in Table 1. All of them are separable Bregman divergences [8], as they can be
characterized using a strictly convex function φ : I ⊆ R→ R, the generator of the Bregman divergence
being just:
ϕ(x)
def
=
∑
i
φ(xi) . (4)
It might seem that (2) unveils a strong assymetry between the two parameters of a Bregman
divergence, all the more as that Bregman divergences are not symmetric in almost all cases [15]. This
distinction becomes more superficial — but crucial for our purpose — as Legendre duality enters the
analysis. Any Bregman divergence is indeed equal to a Bregman divergence over swapped parameters
in the generator’s gradient space. To make it formal, the generator ϕ of a Bregman divergence admits
a convex conjugate ϕ⋆ : Rd → R given by [17]:
ϕ⋆(y)
def
= sup
x∈X
{〈x,y〉 − ϕ(x)} (5)
= 〈y,∇−1ϕ (y)〉 − ϕ
(
∇
−1
ϕ (y)
)
, (6)
where ∇−1ϕ , the inverse gradient, is well-defined because of the strict convexity of ϕ. The follow-
ing Theorem, whose proof follows from plugging (6) in (1), states the dual symmetry of Bregman
divergences.
Theorem 2 Dϕ(x||y) = Dϕ⋆(∇ϕ(y)||∇ϕ(x)).
It follows from (2) and the strict convexity of ϕ that the minimizer of the expected dual divergence
Dϕ⋆(.||.) can be expressed in int(dom(ϕ)) as:
µϕ
def
= ∇−1ϕ (ED∇ϕ(X)) . (7)
The set spanned by (7), which includes the arithmetic average (take φ
def
= x2/2 in (4)), is close to the
set of f -means [11], a set whose studies date back to the early thirties, by Kolmogorov and Nagumo.
To summarize the conceptual justifications for the use of aggregators having shape (7), three main
motivations could justify their use: first, they are all optimal distortion estimators — and the only
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ones to be optimal – in the sense of Theorem 1; second, they encode maximum likelihood estimators
for a majority of popular distributions; third, they encode geodesic-like curves in the geometry of the
information space [15]. For all these reasons, they can be considered the best information aggregators
for the data they summarize (data which could be prices, consumptions, labors, wages, etc. in the
economic world).
Hereafter, we consider averages (7) with finite support of size m > 0, and replace (2) by the
more general search for argy∈Rd min
∑m
i=1 γiF (xi,y), with γi > 0,∀i = 1, 2, ...,m. A rapid glimpse at
(2) reveals that the solution is
∑m
i=1 γixi, and so the extension of (7) to the minimizer of a general
weighted sum of Bregman divergences now takes the more general form:
µϕ
def
= Γ∇−1ϕ
(
1
Γ
m∑
i=1
γi∇ϕ(xi)
)
, (8)
with Γ
def
=
∑m
i=1 γi. Because of (2), any µϕ as in (8) is called a low-distortion aggregator (LDA). For
economic and mathematical reasons, averages having the form (8) with a concave or convex regime
are particularly interesting. The following Theorem allows to catch the picture of where concavity
and convexity lie: the symmetric dual average of some average (8) enjoys the symmetric regime. If
one is concave, the other is convex and vice versa.
Theorem 3 µϕ is concave if and only if µϕ⋆ is convex.
(proof: see the Appendix). To finish up with information, we state the last result that shall be useful
in the sequel.
Theorem 4 Let µϕ a concave (resp. convex) average that follows (7). Then it is upperbounded (resp.
lowerbounded) by the sum: s =
∑m
i=1 γixi. Furthermore, ∇ϕ is concave (resp. convex), and ∇
−1
ϕ is
convex (resp. concave).
(proof: see the Appendix).
3 Economic Aggregators
Because a LDA µϕ does not change by adding a constant term to its generator ϕ, it should be kept in
mind that generators shall be given up to any such constant. Furthermore, our analysis takes place
for separable generators, that meet (4). This eases readability while encompassing most economic
settings. For such reasons, it is also convenient to assume that domφ ⊆ R+, and introduce the
following notation for any relevant k ∈ N∗:
φ[k](x)
def
=
dkφ(x)
dxk
. (9)
3.1 Optimality of Economic Aggregators
Let x⋆ denote an aggregator for values x1, x2, ..., xm (m ∈ N∗). One of the most common economic
aggregators is the CES function [2]:
x⋆
def
=
(
m∑
i=1
βix
σ−1
σ
i
) σ
σ−1
. (10)
The formulation in σ is not the simplest but it is intentional, as it depicts the constant elasticity of
substitution inside values aggregated [5]. Here, βi > 0 is the weight of aggregated value xi. Further
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constraints of economic relevance are generally imposed on σ depending on the setting in which (10)
is applied [5]; in order to remain as general as possible, we consider the unrestricted setting for which
σ ∈ R∗\{1}. We now show that a CES is a LDA.
Lemma 1 Any CES x⋆ as defined in (10) is a LDA for the generator
φces(x)
def
= ax2−
1
σ , (11)
with a ∈ R∗ any constant for which (11) is convex, and γi
def
= βiB
1
σ−1 ,∀i = 1, 2, ...,m. Here, B
def
=∑m
i=1 βi.
(proof: see the Appendix). Aggregators are sometimes tied up via important economic equalities. One
example relates prices and consumptions. Let m denote the number of goods, and the consumption
function of good i is noted ci. The price of good i is pi. Two aggregators for consumptions and prices,
respectively c⋆ and p⋆ are devised so as to satisfy:
m∑
i=1
cipi = p⋆c⋆ . (12)
Further economic assumptions can be made, such as the concavity of c⋆, which indicates the preference
for diversity [9]. The popular choice for c⋆ is a CES function (10) [2]. Notice that the weights in the
LDA (γi) are different from the weights in the CES (βi). Modulo a simple normalization of the CES,
they remain equal. If we multiply c⋆ by B
1/(1−σ), the normalized CES obtained is such that γi = βi.
Furthermore, this normalization, for which B1/(1−σ) = m1/(1−σ) when all βi = 1, is one which turns
out to play a key role in economic models [5].
The price aggregator, p⋆, can be found by inspecting (12) after remarking that partial derivatives
on the left and right-hand side must also coincide. After a standard derivation using (10) for c⋆, we
obtain that the price index has the form:
p⋆ =
(
m∑
i=1
βσi p
1−σ
i
) 1
1−σ
. (13)
p⋆ has also the general CES form of (10); for completeness, we characterize below its LDA (proof
similar to Lemma 1).
Lemma 2 Let δi
def
= βσi , and ∆
def
=
∑m
i=1 δi. The price index in (13) is a LDA for the generator:
φp(x)
def
= bx2−σ , (14)
with b ∈ R∗ any constant for which (14) is convex, and γi
def
= δi∆
σ
1−σ ,∀i = 1, 2, ...,m.
Modulo the normalization of the CES for c⋆, and the choice βi = 1, (13) would return to the conven-
tional choice in which βσi → 1/m. It is quite a remarkable fact that p⋆ and c⋆ are LDA under the sole
assumptions of (12) and c⋆ is a CES. Such a property also holds for labor and wages. Suppose we have
n consumer-workers, each of which selling a particular labor type; let wj be the wage for labor-type j
and nj the demand for labor-type j, for j = 1, 2, ..., n. Then there exists an aggregate labor-demand
index n⋆, and a wage index w⋆, such that [5]:
n∑
j=1
wini = w⋆n⋆ . (15)
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The CES form for w⋆ [5] implies both the LDA property for w⋆ and n⋆ (Lemmata 1 and 2). To
summarize, popular aggregators for consumptions, prices, labor and wages are all LDAs, which means
that they are all optimal from the information theory standpoint. Before drilling down further into
the properties that yield relationships like (12) or (15), let us give a brief panorama of which Bregman
divergences are involved so far.
The Bregman divergence of a CES (10) is:
Dφces(x||z) = a
m∑
i=1
{
x
2− 1
σ
i −
(
2−
1
σ
)
xiz
1− 1
σ
i +
(
1−
1
σ
)
z
2− 1
σ
i
}
. (16)
Since any CES is a LDA, it follows that Cobb-Douglas and Leontief functions are limit LDAs, re-
spectively when σ → 1 and σ → 0+. While Leontief function, x⋆
def
= mini{βixi}, does not admit a
generator (it is not differentiable), Cobb-Douglas,
x⋆
def
=
m∏
i=1
xβii , (17)
admits one, which is:
φcd(x)
def
= b(x log x− x) (18)
= bφkl(x)
(see Table 1; b ∈ R+,∗ is any constant). If we look at the price index in (13), we get the following
result.
Lemma 3 Fix b = 1/((2 − σ)(1 − σ)) in (14), assuming σ 6= 1, and let φIS
def
= − log x (see Table 1).
Then
lim
σ→2
Dϕp(x||z) = DϕIS(x||z) . (19)
This result is easily proven once we remark that xk ≈ 1 + k log x + o(k). The right-hand side of
(19) is Itakura-Saito divergence (Table 1). Together with the fact that the limit divergence for c⋆ is
Kullback-Leibler divergence when σ → 1, we get the generators for two popular divergences of signal
processing and statistics [15]. A well-known similar result holds for a particular subset of Bregman
divergences, Amari α-divergences, for which [1]:
φa(x)
def
= 4
(
x− x
1+α
2
)
/(1− α2), α ∈ [−1, 1] . (20)
Taking limits of the generator when α reaches the interval bounds yields Itakura-Saito and Kullback-
Leibler divergences.
3.2 Completeness of Economic Aggregators
In this section, we consider some relevant economic assumptions about aggregators, and show that any
LDA that would meet such assumptions would necessarily belong to a particular subclass of LDAs.
This subclass is called “complete” for the assumption at hand.
The first assumption we consider is about any two dual aggregators x⋆ (for x1, x2, ..., xm) and z⋆
(for z1, z2, ..., zm) that would meet the following abstraction of (12) and (15):
m∑
i=1
xizi = x⋆z⋆ . (21)
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We show that CES turns out to be complete for dual aggregators, as the LDA assumption for any of
the two implies that both are CES. We state it more formally below.
Theorem 5 Suppose that at least one of x⋆ and z⋆ that satisfies (21) is a LDA. Then both x⋆ and z⋆
are CES. Furthermore, they are linked through the identity φ
[2]
z = d
(
φ
[2]
x
)−1
for some d ∈ R∗.
(proof: see the Appendix). CES turns out to be complete from another standpoint: elasticities.
Consider some LDA x⋆; its elasticity with respect to xi (i = 1, 2, ...,m) is defined as:
e
xi
x⋆
def
=
(
dx⋆
x⋆
)
/
(
dxi
xi
)
. (22)
Consider the economic assumption that all elasticities sum to one. We show that CES is complete for
this assumption.
Theorem 6 Let x⋆(x1, x2, ..., xm) be any LDA. Then
∑m
i=1 e
xi
x⋆ = 1 if and only if x⋆ is a CES.
(proof: see the Appendix). We now switch to another important economic quantity, the substitution
elasticity of xi for xj in x⋆, e
xi→xj
x⋆ , defined by:
e
xi→xj
x⋆
def
=
(
d(xj/xi)
xj/xi
)
/
(
ds
xi→xj
x⋆
s
xi→xj
x⋆
)
, (23)
where
s
xi→xj
x⋆
def
=
(
∂x⋆
∂xi
)
/
(
∂x⋆
∂xj
)
(24)
is the marginal rate of substitution of xi for xj. Another economic assumption commonly encountered
is the fact that e
xi→xj
x⋆ is assumed to be unit. We show that the complete LDA subclass for this
assumption is, this time, Cobb-Douglas.
Theorem 7 Let x⋆(x1, x2, ..., xm) be any LDA. Then, there exists indices 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m such that
e
xi→xj
x⋆ = 1 if and only if x⋆ is a Cobb-Douglas.
(proof: see the Appendix). It is interesting to notice that the LDA assumption competes with the
homogeneity assumptions about x⋆ that are required to come up with the same result (i.e. without
making the LDA assumption). The fact that we are able to alleviate the economic setting (homogeneity
ties up x⋆ with assumptions on returns to scale) while ending up with the same aggregator makes
information a very valuable companion to introduce the true nature of popular economic aggregators.
One question which remains is however what would imply the homogeneity assumption alone in a
LDA setting. We define x⋆ to be homogeneous of degree a ∈ R∗ if and only if:
x⋆(λx1, λx2, ..., λxm) = λ
ax⋆(x1, x2, ..., xm) , (25)
for every λ ∈ R+. We show that the complete LDA subclass for this assumption varies depending on
the values of a. Without losing too much generality, the Theorem assumes that φ
[2]
x is differentiable.
Theorem 8 Let x⋆(x1, x2, ..., xm) be any LDA, and a ∈ R∗. Then:
• x⋆ is homogeneous of degree a 6= 1 if and only if it is a Cobb-Douglas;
• x⋆ is homogeneous of degree a = 1 if and only if it is a Cobb-Douglas or a CES.
(proof: see the Appendix).
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Optimality Completeness
(LDA) Th. 5 Th. 6 Th. 7 Th. 8 Th. 8
(a 6= 1) (a = 1)
CES Y Y Y N N Y
Cobb-Douglas Y N N Y Y Y
Leontief L L L N N L
MST N N N N N N
Table 2: Summary of our results on four families of aggregators: CES, Cobb-Douglas, Leontief and
MST, with respect to the assumptions made in Theorems 5, 6, 7 and 8 (see text for details).
4 Discussion
Families of economic aggregators Table 2 summarizes the results obtained on three families of
aggregators: CES, Cobb-Douglas and Leontief. For each of them we give the indication of whether
they are LDAs (Y/N), whether they can be in the limit (L), and whether they become complete for
the assumptions made in Theorems 5, 6, 7 and 8 (Y / N / L). Remark that the Table makes a clear
distinction between all these three families of aggregators. There exists various other aggregators in
economic works; for obvious space reasons, we have chosen to focus on the most popular, and it turns
out that all have strong relationships with LDAs, either directly, or at the limit. In order to cover the
possible relationships between aggregators and LDAs, let us take a last example, of a general class of
aggregators that we call Mitscherlich-Spillman-von Thu¨nen (MST) aggregators [14, 18, 19], a family
in which the global form of aggregator x⋆ reduces directly or after a variable change to (θ ∈ {−1,+1}):
x⋆
def
=
m∏
i=1
(1− exp(θγixi)) . (26)
Such aggregators date back to the XIXth century, and so they have preceded those we have been
focusing on so far. What we can show is that, contrasting with their successors, MST aggregators are
not LDAs.
Lemma 4 MST aggregators are not LDAs.
(proof: see the Appendix).
Aggregators and economic constraints Modulo changes of variables, Theorems (5) - (8) could
be alleviated from the constraint of the LDA choice under their respective economic assumptions.
Consider for example (21), in which we would like to plug any LDA. To be concrete, let us stick
to prices and consumptions in (12). Consider the generator φc˜ of some strictly concave LDA c˜⋆
that aggregates its consumptions c˜i for i = 1, 2, ...,m. Let us say that strict concavity is chosen
because usual consumption indexes are concave, to indicate the consumer’s preference for diversity
[9]. Consider the change of variables that involves some (concave) CES:
ci
def
=
(
φ
[1]
ces
)−1 (
φ
[1]
c˜ (c˜i)
)
. (27)
If we consider that consumptions ci are the actual observed consumptions (the c˜i’s being “hidden”,
non-observed consumptions), the aggregator c⋆ for those lifted consumptions is a CES which may be
9
c˜i c˜jc˜⋆
pi > p⋆
pj < p⋆
φ
[2]
c˜ (x)
φ
[2]
c˜ (c˜⋆)
Figure 1: Prices vs consumptions for a concave consumption LDA in (30): regardless of the LDA, for
any good i, if its price is larger (resp. smaller) than the price index, its consumption cannot be larger
(resp. smaller) than the normalized consumption index (see text for details).
plugged in (12). Reconstructing c˜⋆ is immediate as we have:
c˜⋆ =
(
φ
[1]
c˜
)−1 (
φ
[1]
ces(c⋆)
)
. (28)
In order not to laden the discussion, let us consider that all weights βi = 1/m, and that we keep the
CES form for p⋆ (pi = p˜i). What interests us here is not exactly the consumption index (c⋆), but the
normalized index, c⋆
def
= c⋆/m, which is really homogeneous to the consumption of a single good. We
also define the same index c˜⋆ for c˜⋆, and assume the same relationship as (28) for these two indices.
Differentiating (12) in ci yields:
pi
p⋆
=
φ
[2]
ces(ci)
φ
[2]
ces(c⋆)
, (29)
from which we obtain using (27) and (28):
pi
p⋆
=
φ
[2]
c˜ (c˜i)
φ
[2]
c˜ (c˜⋆)
. (30)
Eq. (30) is interesting because it displays a remarkably stable behavior that holds for any concave
LDA. Because of Theorem 4 and the convexity of φ, φ
[2]
c˜ is monotonic decreasing and strictly positive.
Thus, it converges towards some non negative value. Figure 1 gives an overview of how prices and
consumptions always behave. There are two conclusions to draw from the figure. The first is a sanity
check, as larger prices mean lower consumptions, a conclusion that follows from dividing (30) for
distinct goods i and j. Indeed, if a good i has price pi > pj , then we shall have c˜i ≤ c˜j (notice,
from (27), that it is equivalent to saying ci ≤ cj). We also remark that prices that are larger (resp.
smaller) than the price index mean consumptions that are smaller (resp. larger) than the normalized
consumption index (see Figure 1). The second is the dampening effect of prices on consumptions: a
small difference on prices may incur a very large difference on consumptions if those prices are already
small, and it can make almost no difference on consumptions if prices are high.
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Figure 2: Intervals for which the marginal rate of substitution of xi for xj (or xl) exceeds unit when
x⋆ is a concave (left) or convex (right) LDA.
Global behaviors of LDAs as economic aggregators Even without a change of variables, LDAs
sometimes display economic regimes with extremely close behaviors, as witnessed by the marginal rate
of substitution of xi for xj. Indeed, whenever x⋆ is a LDA, we have:
s
xi→xj
x⋆ =
γiφ
[2]
x (xi)
γjφ
[2]
x (xj)
. (31)
Figure 2 displays the general behaviors of sxi→x.x⋆ as a function of the concavity or convexity of x⋆. In
the convex case, Theorem 4 and the convexity of φ bring that φ
[2]
x is monotonic increasing and strictly
positive, hence the schema depicted in Figure 2 (right). The dashed rectangles depict the intervals for
which this marginal rate of substitution would be greater than 1, that is, locations where we would
be willing to trade more than one unit of x. to obtain one unit of xi. The behavior is remarkably
linked with the global regime of x⋆: when it is concave, Figure 2 (left) clearly displays a preference
for diversity, while when it is convex, Figure 2 (right) shows the symmetric trend, an aversion for
diversity.
Aggregators of aggregators and economic programs LDAs may incorporate heterogeneous
quantities and even LDAs as well, as it is common for economic aggregators to integrate other economic
aggregators. Examples show how the whole aggregate may behave, and how global regimes underlined
above for “baseline” aggregators also emerge in a simple manner for whole aggregates as well. Consider
the determination of the global consumption index c⋆ and money expenses m (hereafter, m does not
refer anymore to the number of aggregated values) of a consumer, based on his/her whole budget r
and price indices p⋆ (we do not make any assumption on the form of c⋆ and p⋆). The consumer solves
the maximization of a utility aggregator u⋆:
max
c⋆,m
u⋆ s.t. p⋆c⋆ +m = r . (32)
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Let us investigate the general solution of (32), under the sole assumption that u⋆ is some concave LDA
that mixes consumption and money via some Bernoulli distribution B(γ) for coefficients γi, i = 1, 2
which leverages the importance of consumption and money in u⋆:
u⋆ = ∇
−1
φu
(γ∇φu (c⋆) + (1− γ)∇φu (m/p⋆)) . (33)
The following Theorem states the fundamental relationships that may be used to determine c⋆ and
m, for any concave LDA.
Theorem 9 The optimal values for c⋆ and m in (32) satisfy:
φ[2]u (c⋆) =
1− γ
γ
φ[2]u
(
r
p⋆
− c⋆
)
, (34)
φ[2]u
(
m
p⋆
)
=
γ
1− γ
φ[2]u
(
r
p⋆
−
m
p⋆
)
. (35)
(proof: see the Appendix). Because φ
[2]
u is monotonous decreasing and strictly positive, solving (34)
and (35) can be done via a simple dichotomic search in the general case where φ[2](x) would be strictly
monotonous (when strict monotonicity is not ensured, we may logically end up with an interval of
values). The proof of Theorem 9 reveals an interesting relationship between consumption and money,
namely:
φ[2]u (c⋆) =
1− γ
γ
φ[2]u
(
m
p⋆
)
. (36)
Figure 3 displays this relationship, and more precisely where m/p⋆ is located with respect to c⋆,
depending on γ. Remark that when γ > 1/2, which marks the predominance of consumption over
money in the consumers’ utility function u⋆, Figure 3 shows that c⋆ indeed represents more than
money in the whole budget, as we recall that c⋆ + (m/p⋆) = r/p⋆. The symmetric situation holds
when γ < 1/2.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to demonstrate that the choice of various economic aggregators, that have
mainly been originally built on empirical economic grounds, meet optimality from the information
standpoint, and most notably, remain the only optimal aggregators as various standard economic
assumptions are considered. In these settings, they are the only ways one could summarize at best
numerous individual variables in aggregate indexes, designed to represent their collective economic
behavior at the global level. We have also displayed the fact that information aggregators meet
consistent economic behaviors for fairly general settings, and that these behaviors may be extracted
using simple derivations.
Our results might have applications, and implications, on various economic areas whose theoretical
and empirical results depend on the use of functions embodied in the LDAs studied in this paper.
This includes, for instance, theories such as imperfect competition, international trade and growth
theory. LDAs might make it possible to transfer, in the economic frameworks, three main advantages
that Bregman divergences in general have extensively brought to statistics, classification and even
geometry [4, 15, 16]. First, the analytical expression of a LDA can be extremely complex, yet the
abstraction of the general form (8), and its properties (Theorems 3, 4), makes it possible for fairly
complex behaviors to be derived in a simple manner. Second, it has been shown in the aforementioned
fields that algorithms for solving different problems on a single divergence could be generalized to
solving the same problems on any divergence. Last, but not least, LDAs encode such a large variety
of functions that they could make it easier to find tight fits to economic data.
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φ[2]u (c⋆)
c⋆
φ[2]u (x)
φ[2]u
(
m
p⋆
)
m
p⋆
y = x
y = γ
1−γ
x, γ > 1/2
y = γ
1−γ
x, γ < 1/2
Figure 3: Depiction of the relationships between consumption and money for the consumer’s program
(32) (when γ > 1/2 and γ < 1/2; see text for details).
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 4 in [3] states the result for a function that meets [1], [3] and F (x,x) = 0,∀x ∈ Rd (the
⇐ in [2]). F also meets identity of indiscernibles as otherwise indeed, (2) would be violated for any
distribution with distinct x and y as support and such that F (x,y) = 0. In this case, the solution of
the left-hand side of (2) would be x or y, but not their average.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Because of its independent interest for Bregman divergences, we state the proof in the most general
form: we do not make the assumption that the generator is separable (4). Without loss of generality,
we assume Γ = 1 in (8). The concavity of µϕ means:
Ej∇
−1
ϕ (Ei∇ϕ(xij)) ≤ ∇
−1
ϕ (Ei∇ϕ(Ejxij)) . (37)
Let xij
def
= ∇−1ϕ (x
′
ij) for x
′
ij ∈ im(∇ϕ). Applying ∇ϕ on both sides (ϕ is strictly convex, so ∇ϕ is
bijective) and replacing yields:
∇ϕ(Ej∇
−1
ϕ (Eix
′
ij)) ≤ Ei∇ϕ(Ej∇
−1
ϕ (x
′
ij)) . (38)
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Eq. (38) states the convexity of the LDA µ
def
= ∇ϕ(ED∇
−1
ϕ (X)), but Legendre duality implies
∇ϕ = ∇
−1
ϕ⋆ , and we get µ = µϕ⋆ , the dual of LDA µϕ. The proof starting from the convexity of µϕ
follows the same path.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 4
We prove the first part of the Theorem relating µϕ and s. Without loss of generality and to save
notations, we make the proof for separable generators (4) and take a route slightly different from a
direct use of Jensen’s inequality. Furthermore, we make the proof for the concave case, assuming (8)
holds for µϕ. Division by Γ does not change the regime, and so µϕ/Γ = ∇
−1
φ (
∑m
i=1 (γi/Γ)∇φ(xi)) is
concave. We compute the tangential hyperplane to µϕ/Γ when xi = x˜ ∈ int(dom(φ)),∀i = 1, 2, ...,m.
We know that since µϕ/Γ is concave, it shall be located below this hyperplane. We have ∇µϕ/Γ =
[· · · (γi/Γ)φ
[2](xi)/φ
[2](µϕ) · · ·]
⊤, and so the tangential hyperplane to x˜ = [· · · x˜ · · ·]⊤ on any x is (with
κi
def
= γi/Γ):
z(x) = µϕ(x˜) + 〈x− x˜,∇µϕ/Γ(x˜)〉
= x˜+ 〈κ,x〉 − x˜
= 〈κ,x〉 =
m∑
i=1
(γi/Γ)xi . (39)
We obtain µϕ/Γ ≤
∑m
i=1 (γi/Γ)xi. This yields to the statement that µϕ ≤ s, as claimed. The proof
for the convex case is similar. The second part of the Theorem is an immediate consequence of the
first part, and so this ends the proof of Theorem 4.
6.4 Proof of Lemma 1
We have φ
[1]
ces(x) = a(2σ−1)x
(σ−1)/σ/σ and
(
φ
[1]
ces
)−1
(x) = (σx/(a(2σ−1)))σ/(σ−1) . There remains
to remark that B =
∑m
i=1 βi = B
σ
σ−1 , use (8) and get:
µφces = B
σ
σ−1
(
1
B
σ
σ−1
m∑
i=1
B
1
σ−1βix
σ−1
σ
i
) σ
σ−1
, (40)
which, after simplification, gives (10), as claimed.
6.5 Proof of Theorem 5
Without loss of generality, we first show that, if x⋆ is a LDA that meets (21), it is a CES. We thus
assume the form (8) for x⋆. Using (8), we obtain that x⋆ satisfies (we replace in this proof notation
φx by the simpler φ for the sake of readability):
φ[1]
(x⋆
Γ
)
=
1
Γ
m∑
i=1
γiφ
[1](xi) , (41)
with γi ≥ 0,∀i = 1, 2, ...,m, and Γ
def
=
∑m
i=1 γi. If we differentiate (12) with respect to any xi, using
(8), we get:
zi
z⋆
=
γiφ
[2](xi)
φ[2](x⋆/Γ)
. (42)
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We multiply both sides by xi/(Γx⋆), sum for all i, simplify via (12), rearrange, and get:
x⋆
Γ
φ[2]
(x⋆
Γ
)
=
1
Γ
m∑
i=1
γixiφ
[2](xi) . (43)
Now, we match (41) with (43), and get that φ must satisfy:
∃κ ∈ R∗ s.t. φ
[1](x) = κxφ[2](x),∀x ∈ domφ . (44)
The solution is found to be φ[1](x) ∝ xκ, i.e.:
φ(x) =
d
κ+ 1
xκ+1 , (45)
with d ∈ R∗ any constant that keeps (45) convex. Matching (45) with (11) implies σ = 1/(1−κ), and
we get the proof that x⋆ is a CES.
Lemma 2 then implies that z⋆ is also a CES. The proof that φ
[2]
z = d
(
φ[2]
)−1
for some d ∈ R∗
follows from the expressions of φc and φp in Lemmata 1 and 2.
6.6 Proof of Theorem 6
It is well-known that the property is true for any CES, so we investigate the reverse implication, and
given any LDA x⋆, let φ (which replaces φx for the sake of readability) denote its generator. Using
(8), we obtain:
e
xi
x⋆ =
γixiφ
[2](xi)
x⋆φ[2](x⋆/Γ)
. (46)
Summing this for i = 1, 2, ...,m and rearranging, we get that the sum of elasticities of x⋆ is one implies:
x⋆
Γ
φ[2]
(x⋆
Γ
)
=
1
Γ
m∑
i=1
γixiφ
[2](xi) . (47)
This is exactly (43). There remains to conclude that x⋆ is a CES as in the proof of Theorem 5.
6.7 Proof of Theorem 7
Implication ⇐ is folklore, so we investigate the reverse implication. For any LDA x⋆ whose generator
is denoted φ, e
xi→xj
x⋆ = 1 implies, with x˜ij
def
= xj/xi:
ds
xi→xj
x⋆
dx˜ij
=
s
xi→xj
x⋆
x˜ij
, (48)
implying s
xi→xj
x⋆ = κx˜ij , for some κ > 0 which does not depend on xi or xj . We obtain that x⋆ satisfies
the following PDE:
xi
(
∂x⋆
∂xi
)
− κxj
(
∂x⋆
∂xj
)
= 0 . (49)
Because x⋆ is a LDA, we have ∂x⋆/∂xi = γiφ
[2](xi)/φ
[2](x⋆), and so (49) becomes:
γixiφ
[2](xi) = κγjxjφ
[2](xj) . (50)
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Since κ, γi, γj > 0 and (50) holds for any xi, xj ∈ int(domφ
[1]), we obtain that xφ[2](x) is constant.
This yields φ(x) = b(x log x − x) for some constant b ∈ R+,∗, the generator of Cobb-Douglas LDA
(18), as claimed.
Remark : (50) also proves that if m > 2 and we require unit substitution elasticity between more
than two goods, then necessarily κ = 1 and γi = γj, ∀i, j = 1, 2, ...,m. By means of words, fixing unit
substitution elasticity for more than two goods implies equal weights for the goods. Clearly, this is a
property of Cobb-Douglas aggregator rather than a restriction for LDAs.
6.8 Proof of Theorem 8
Implication ⇐ is folklore, so we investigate the reverse implication. For any LDA x⋆ whose generator
is denoted φ, (25) implies:
Γ∇−1φ
(
1
Γ
m∑
i=1
γi∇φ(λxi)
)
= λaΓ∇−1φ
(
1
Γ
m∑
i=1
γi∇φ(xi)
)
. (51)
Take some xi, i = 1, 2, ...,m, and differentiate both sides in xi. We get after simplification:
λφ[2](λxi)
φ[2](λax⋆)
=
λaφ[2](xi)
φ[2](x⋆)
. (52)
• Case 1: a 6= 1. Suppose that xi = xj = z/λ,∀i, j = 1, 2, ...,m, which implies x⋆ = z/λ as well.
Eq. (52) simplifies to:
φ[2](λa−1z) =
1
λa−1
φ[2](z) , (53)
i.e. φ[2] is homogeneous of degree −1. Euler’s homogeneous function Theorem implies that φ[2]
satisfies the following PDE:
xφ[3](x) + φ[2](x) = 0 , (54)
whose solution is φ[2](x) ∝ 1/x (with a positive factor), i.e. φ(x) = b(x log x − x) for some
constant b ∈ R+,∗, the generator of Cobb-Douglas LDA (18), as claimed.
• Case 2: a = 1. In this case, (52) implies:
φ[2](λx) = g(λ)φ[2](x) , (55)
for any function g(λ) ∈ R∗. Suppose without loss of generality that g is C1, so that we can take
the route of the proof of Euler’s homogeneous function Theorem. We differentiate (55) in λ, and
take the resulting equation for λ = 1. We obtain the following PDE:
xφ[3](x)− g[1](1)φ[2](x) = 0 , (56)
i.e. φ[2](x) ∝ xκ, where κ ∈ R∗ is some constant. We obtain that φ is either of the form of (11),
or (18), the generators of CES and Cobb-Douglas LDAs, as claimed.
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6.9 Proof of Lemma 4
After differentiation on some xi, should it be a LDA, any MST aggregator x⋆ with generator φ would
satisfy:
γi ×
−θ exp(θγixi)
(1− exp(θγixi))
× x⋆ = γ
′
i × φ
[2](xi)×
1
φ[2](x⋆)
, (57)
with γ′i the LDA weight for xi. This would imply φ
[2](x) = 1/x, from which the simplification
of (57) yields that regardless of the value of xi, the corresponding weights γi and γ
′
i must satisfy
−θγixi exp(θγixi) = γ
′
i(1− exp(θγixi)), impossible.
6.10 Proof of Theorem 9
Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier for (32), so that the Lagrangian is L
def
= u⋆ + λ(r − p⋆c⋆ −m), and
we obtain the following stationarity conditions for the optimum:
∂L
∂c⋆
=
γφ
[2]
u (c⋆)
φ
[2]
u (u⋆)
− λp⋆ = 0 , (58)
∂L
∂m
=
(1− γ)φ
[2]
u (m/p⋆)
p⋆φ
[2]
u (u⋆)
− λ = 0 . (59)
Solving (59) for λ and simplifying (58) yields:
φ[2]u (c⋆) =
1− γ
γ
φ[2]u
(
m
p⋆
)
. (60)
There remains to use the identity p⋆c⋆ +m = r to get (34) and (35), as claimed.
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